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INTERPRETING THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS: GENEROSITY AND
JUSTIFICATION*
By PETER W. HOGG*

The author argues that there is a close relationship between the scope
of the rights guaranteed by the Charter and the standard of justification
required under section 1. The broader the scope of a right, the more
relaxed the standard of justification must be. A generous interpretation
of a right is incompatible with the stringent Oakes standard of
justification. However, a purposiveinterpretation of a right, confining the
right to conduct that is worthy of constitutional protection, is compatible
with a stringent standard of justification.
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I. GENEROSITY AND JUSTIFICATION
At a recent Justice Department Conference, I was asked to
address the topic, "A Review of Supreme Court of Canada Charter
Decisions: Trends in the Future." As I reviewed the cases, it
seemed to me that the key to the future development of the
Charter' lay in the resolution of a conflict between two contradictory
doctrines, both of which have been warmly, even fervently, embraced
by the Supreme Court of Canada. The first doctrine, articulated in
Hunter v. Southam Inc.2 and R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd,3 as well as
many subsequent cases, is that the guaranteed rights should be given
a generous interpretation. The second doctrine, articulated in R. v.

1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.Kt), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 156.

3 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344 [hereinafter Big M4].
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Oakes,4 is that a stringent standard of justification is required under
section 1.
The argument of this paper is that there is a close
relationship between the scope of the rights guaranteed by the
Charter and the standard of justification required under section 1.
The broader the scope of the rights, the more relaxed the standard
of justification must be. The narrower the scope of the rights, the
more stringent the standard of justification must be. It is not
possible to insist that Charter rights should be given a generous
interpretation, that is, a wide scope, and at the same time insist that
the standard of justification under section 1 should be a stringent
one. One of these two contradictory positions must give way.
My view on the issue is this. The Court's decision in Oakes
to prescribe a single standard of justification for all rights, to make
that standard a high one, and to cast the burden of satisfying it on
the government entails a corresponding caution in defining the
guaranteed rights. Each right should be so interpreted as not to
reach behaviour that is outside the purpose of the right behaviour that is not worthy of constitutional protection. If this is
ignored, the inevitable result will be the erosion of the Oakes
standard of justification; it can be taken for granted that the Court
will find a way of upholding legislation in the face of Charter claims
that are regarded by the judges as weak.
The reason that generosity should give way, rather than the
stringent standard of justification, concerns the policy-making role
of the courts. If the scope of the guaranteed rights is wide, and the
standard of justification is relaxed, then a large number of Charter
challenges will come before the courts and will fall to be determined
under section 1. Since section 1 requires that the policy of the
legislation be balanced against the policy of the Charter, and since
it is difficult to devise meaningful standards to constrain the
balancing process, judicial review will become even more pervasive,
even more policy-laden, and even more unpredictable than it is now.
While some judges will welcome such extensive powers, most judges
will be concerned to stem the wasteful floods of litigation, to limit
the occasions when they have to review the policy choices of
4 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakey].
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legislative bodies, and to introduce meaningful rules to the process
of Charter review. These purposes can be accomplished only by
restricting the scope of the Charter rights.
I.

PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION

How can the scope of the Charter rights be restricted
without abandoning or undermining the civil libertarian values that
the Charterprotects? The Supreme Court of Canada has answered
this question in its insistence on a puiposive interpretation of the
Charter rights. The purposive approach to the interpretation of the
Charter was spelled out most fully in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.5
It involves an attempt to ascertain the purpose of each Charterright
and, then, to interpret the right so as to include activity that comes
within the purpose and to exclude activity that does not. Of course
this leaves the judges with the task of "finding" the purpose, but
some guidance can be obtained from the language in which the right
is expressed, from the implications to be drawn from the context in
which the right is to be found, including other parts of the Charter,
from the pre-Charter history of the right, and from the legislative
history of the Charter. Moreover, as a body of case-law develops on
the meaning of a particular right, the core of the definition tends to
become settled.
In Hunter v. Southam Inc., the Court assumed that a
purposive approach and a generous approach were one and the
same thing - or, at least, were not inconsistent. Dickson C.J.
quoted the well-known statement of Lord Wilberforce that a bill of
rights should receive a "generous interpretation," and he equated
that statement with "a broad, purposive analysis," which was the
approach he said he intended to take.6 In Big M, Dickson C.J. said
that the definition of a right should be "a generous rather than a

Supra, note 3 at 344.
6 Supra, note 2 at 156. The quotation from Lord Wilberforce is in Minister of Home
Affairs v. Fisher (1979), [1980] A.C. 319 at 328.
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legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and7
securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter's protection."
In Big M, Dickson C.J. did go on to warn that judges should
not "overshoot" the purpose of the right.8 The truth of the matter
is that the widest possible reading of a Charter right, which is the
most generous interpretation, will nearly always "overshoot" the
purpose of the right, by including behaviour that is outside the
purpose and unworthy of constitutional protection. The effect of a
purposive approach is normally going to be to narrow the scope of
the right. Generosity is a helpful idea only if it is subordinate to
purpose; otherwise, it is bound to lead to results that are
inconsistent with a purposive approach.
The purposive approach works in perfect harmony with the
stringent standard of justification under section 1. Once a right has
been confined to its purpose, it seems obvious that a government
ought to have to satisfy a stringent standard of justification to
uphold legislation limiting the right.
III. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A. Legal rights
The Supreme Court of Canada has not only said that it
would give a generous interpretation to the Charter rights, it has
certainly done so. Without doubt it is the legal rights, which,
generally speaking, are the rights of those accused of crime, that
have received the most generous interpretation. These rights have
usually been given the widest possible scope, leading the Court to
often take positions that have been rejected by the Supreme Court
of the United States, even in its expansive (Warren Court) phase.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that a person must
be advised of the right to counsel before taking a mandatory

7 Supra, note 3 at 344.
8 Ibid

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[YOU- 28 No. 4

breathalyser test.9 A suspect who is intoxicated cannot waive the
right to counsel 0 An identification line-up cannot be held until
the accused has successfully contacted counsel, even if that process
may take many hours.11 A search, even one made under a valid
warrant or other authority, becomes unreasonable (that is,
unconstitutional) if there has been a violation of the right to
counsel.1 2 A blood sample taken by a doctor from the free-flowing
wound of an accident victim and handed over to the police is an
unreasonable (that is, unconstitutional) seizure.1 3 An accused who
chooses to testify at trial can prevent the prosecution from using the
evidence against him at a new trial, although any other kind of
voluntary statement would obviously be admissible at the second
trial.14 In all of these situations, the Supreme Court of the United
States either has reached or probably would reach an opposite
15
conclusion.
B. FundamentalJustice
The breadth of the procedural rights of the criminal accused
is striking enough. But it does not compare with the Supreme
Court of Canada's interpretation of fundamental justice in section 7
as encompassing substantive as well as procedural due process. In
Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act RS.B.C.,1 6 the
Court brushed aside the evidence from the history of section 7 that
the phrase fundamental justice had been chosen in order to avoid
9

R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.

10 Clarkson v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383.
11 R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3.
12

R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980.

13 R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417.
14

Dubois v. R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350.

15 R.A. Harvie & H. Foster, "ies that Bind? The Supreme Court of Canada, American
Jurisprudence, and the Revision of Canadian Criminal Law under the Charter" (1990) 28
Osgoode Hall I.J. 729.
16 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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the unfortunate American experience with the concept of
substantive due process. The Court held that the requirement of
fundamental justice was a substantive as well as a procedural one,
and that it had the effect of constitutionalizing the element of mens
rea for any offence for which the accused could be liable to the
punishment of imprisonment (loss of liberty). It followed that an
offence of absolute liability (driving without a valid driver's licence)
was unconstitutional. The Court extended this dramatic decision in
R. v. Vaillancourt,1 7 in which the Court held that the felony-murder
rule in the Criminal Code was unconstitutional. The fact that the
accused did not intend to cause death (although he did intend to
of constitutional
commit a serious crime) meant that, as a matter
18
law, he could not be found guilty of murder.
C. Comment
The cases dealing with the rights of the criminal accused do
not fit my thesis; the broad interpretation of the right has not been
accompanied by a relaxation of the section 1 standard of
justification. Indeed, in R. v. Oakes itself,19 the Court gave the
widest possible interpretation of the presumption of innocence in
section 11(d) and, at the same time, laid down the stringent
standards of justification that are now supposed to regulate the
application of section 1.
While the criminal justice cases do not fit my thesis, the
Court in later cases has been at pains to argue that they form a
special category in which the issue of justification is less complicated
than it is in other branches of the law. In the criminal justice cases,
"The government is best characterized as the singular antagonist of
the individual whose right has been infringed."20 The contrast is
with legislation enacted to protect not just the community at large,
17 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636.
18 See also R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (Criminal Code abortion provisions
struck down).
19 Supra, note 4.
20

Invin Toy Ltd v.A.G. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 994 [hereinafter Irwin Toy].
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but a particular group, sometimes a vulnerable group, such as
unorganized retail workers or children. In such a case, the Court
takes the view that the primacy of the Charter right is much less
obvious. Indeed, the Charter right may "become an instrument of
better situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its
object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged
persons."21 In such a case, if the Charter right that is relied upon
to attack the legislation is a tenuous one, it is obvious that the
Court is going to uphold the legislation without agonizing too long
about whether the Oakes standards have really been met.
IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
A. Sunday Closing
In R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd22 and R. v. Edwards Books
and Art Ltd,23 the Supreme Court of Canada held that Sunday
closing laws were violations of freedom of religion, which is
guaranteed by section 2(a) of the Charter. In these holdings, the
Court reversed an earlier decision of its own, 24 which had held the
contrary under the CanadianBill of Rights, and departed from the
Supreme Court of the United States,25 which had also upheld
Sunday closing laws. As the precedents indicated, the argument that
Sunday closing laws violate freedom of religion is not very strong,
since the financial penalty of closing on a sabbath would be borne
by anyone observing a sabbath, even if there was no Sunday closing
legislation. About all that can be said about the legislation is that
it is arguably a preference for the Christian religion; this may raise

21 Ibid. at 993, citing R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 779
[hereinafter Edwards Books].
22 Supra, note 3.
23 Supra, note 21.
24 Robertson and Rosetanni v. R, [1963] S.C.R. 651.
25

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).

Interpreting the Charter of Rights

1990]

an equality argument, but it is not an obvious denial of freedom of
religion.
The only point that I seek to make in the foregoing
paragraph is that Big M and Edwards Books gave a generous (broad)
interpretation to freedom of religion. How then was section 1
applied? In Big M, the Sunday closing law was a federal law, and
the section 1 argument was rejected on the basis that the federal
Parliament lacked the constitutional power to impose a common day
of rest for secular purposes. In Edwards Books, the Sunday closing
law was a provincial law, applicable only to retail stores, and the
section 1 argument was addressed on the merits. The Court held
that the provision of a common pause day was a sufficiently
important objective to warrant overriding a guaranteed right. It
then moved to the tricky question of whether the law infringed the
Charterright as little as possible. The answer to that, of course, was
no, as Wilson J. (in partial dissent) held: the legislation contained
a narrow exemption for some Saturday-observing retailers, but it
could have contained a much broader exemption, which would have
infringed the right less. But the majority of the Court still held that
the law could be justified under section 1 and was valid. Dickson
C.J. said that the Court should not substitute its opinion for the
Legislature's "as to the place at which to draw a precise line;" he
was satisfied that the Legislature had made a "satisfactory effort" to
accommodate Saturday-observing retailers. 26 La Forest J. said that
"a legislature must be given reasonable room to manoeuvre," and the
27
Court should not interfere with the legislative choice.
The opinions of Dickson C.J. (with whom Chouinard and Le
Dain JJ. agreed) and La Forest J. in Edwards Books constituted a
substantial relaxation of the Oakes standard of section 1 justification.
The reason, I would suggest, was that the Charter right had been
stretched so far that it no longer presented a sufficiently weighty
reason to defeat legislation which was a well intentioned effort to
pursue a benign policy.

26 Supra, note 21 at 782.
27

ibid. at 795-96.
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B. Private Schooling
In R. v. Jones,28 the pastor of a fundamentalist church argued
that his freedom of religion had been abridged because he was not
permitted to operate a religious school for his children in his church
basement. Alberta's School Act did in fact permit this kind of
private instruction, provided the Department of Education issued a
certificate of efficient instruction. There was no reason to suppose
that Jones would be unable to obtain such a certificate, but he
refused to apply for one on the ground that an application to the
state would be contrary to God's will. Wilson J., for the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada, held that the requirement to apply
for a certificate of efficient instruction was not a violation of
freedom of religion. But La Forest J., for a minority of three, held
that the requirement was a violation of freedom of religion.
However, he hastened to hold that the law was justified under
section 1, despite the absence of any evidence as to the necessity of
the requirement.
The minority in Jones was willing to relax the burden-ofproof requirement for section 1 justification because the Charter
guarantee of freedom of religion had been expanded to the point of
the trivial. Such an insubstantial right should not be permitted to
disrupt the administration of a system of compulsory education that
actually made generous provision for alternative, private, religious
forms of instruction.
V. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A. Scope of Right
Freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by section 2(b)
of the Charter, will probably become the main arena where the
relationship between the Charterright and section 1 justification will
be played out. Laws regarding hate propaganda, defamation,
obscenity, soliciting a prostitute, and nude dancing, for example,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 [hereinafter Jones].
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raise the question of whether every communicative act, no matter
how trivial, false, or harmful, enjoys constitutional protection. If the
answer is yes, look for a major relaxation in the section 1 standard
of justification. However, it is more likely that the answer will be
no, that restrictions will be placed on the scope of freedom of
expression, so that women, racial minorities, and other groups need
not re-fight in the courtroom their political battles for protection
from vilification. But it must be acknowledged that the decision in
Irwin Toy points in the opposite direction.
B. Commercial Speech
In Irwin Toy Ltd v. A.G. Quebec,29 the Supreme Court of
Canada held that commercial advertising was covered by the
guarantee of freedom of expression. In fact, the Court went so far
as to say that "[a]ctivity is expressive if it attempts to convey
meaning. "3O This is certainly a generous interpretation. At issue in

Irwin Toy was the validity of a Quebec law prohibiting advertising
directed to children under the age of thirteen. Faithful to the
generous interpretation of the right, the Court held that such
advertising was protected by section 2(b), and that the law infringed
section 2(b).
The Court then turned to the question of whether the law
was saved by section 1. The Court split on this issue, but the
majority said yes. The purpose of the law was sufficiently important:
it was to protect children, who were a vulnerable group. But did
the law impair the guaranteed right as little as possible? Quebec's
law was quite the most drastic solution to the problem of children's
31
advertising that had been adopted by any known jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the majority of the Court held that the Quebec
Legislature could properly conclude "that a ban on commercial
advertising directed to children was the minimal impairment of free
expression consistent with the pressing and substantial goal of
29 Supra, note 20.
30 1bid. at 968.
31 Ibid. at 998.
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protecting children against manipulation through such advertising."32
Here, as in Edwards Books, we see an attitude of deference to the
legislative judgment. The reason for that deference, I would argue,
was the fact that the Charter right had been expanded to cover
activity that was, if not unworthy of protection, at least in need of
some degree of regulation.
The Supreme Court of Canada has decided one other
commercial speech case, namely, Ford v. A.G. Quebec,33 in which it
struck down a Quebec law that required commercial signs to be in
French only. In that case, the section 1 justification was rejected.
The Court held that the banning of English was too drastic a means
of protecting the French language. The case is not unlike Irwin Toy
in that in both cases, the Legislature enacted a drastic measure,
without precedent in other jurisdictions, to protect what it perceived
as a vulnerable group - children in Irwin Toy and French-speakers
in Ford. Perhaps the difference is that the law in Ford was
perceived by the Court as unduly oppressive to the English-speaking
minority, whereas the law in Irwin Toy had its major impact on the
large corporations that manufacture toys, breakfast cereals, soft
drinks, and the like. It is worth noting as well that childrens'
products could still be advertised in Quebec, so long as the
advertising did not use images aimed at children. No similar outlet
was available to the English-speaking business person who wished to
include the English language in a commercial sign.
Although there are some differences between Ford and hwin
Toy that arguably make the different outcomes intelligible, the fact
remains that Ford does not fit my thesis. The wide ambit of the
right (to include commercial speech) was not accompanied by a
relaxation in the standard of section 1 justification, or, at least, not
enough of a relaxation to save the law.

32 kbid. at 999.
33 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford].
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VI. MOBILITY

In United States of America v. Cotroni,34 the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the extradition of a Canadian citizen offended
section 6(1) of the Charter, which guarantees to every citizen of
remain in ...
Canada."
Canada "the right to ...

In reaching this

conclusion, La Forest J., for the majority of the Court, emphasized
that the Chartershould receive a generous interpretation. 3s Indeed,
he went on to acknowledge that "the infringement of s. 6(1) that
edges of the core values
results from extradition lies at the outer 36
provision."
that
by
protected
be
sought to
The idea that Canadian citizens accused of crime in another
country could resist extradition on constitutional grounds is a
startling conclusion that would put Canada in breach of its many
extradition treaties and seriously hamper the efforts of international
law enforcement. Canada would become a refuge for those of its
citizens who were international criminals. Not suprisingly, therefore,
La Forest J. went on to hold that the ExtraditionAct was saved by
section 1 of the Charter. The beneficent purpose of the Act was
not in doubt: the suppression of crime clearly qualified as a
sufficiently important purpose. But did the Act impair the right as
little as possible? On this issue, the Court divided. The two
dissenters, Wilson and Sopinka JJ., held that the objective of
suppressing crime could be achieved by prosecuting the accused in
Canada instead of extraditing them. This was possible because the
crimes with which they were charged (conspiracies to import drugs
into the United States) had been committed in Canada. When the
accused could be prosecuted in Canada, the dissenters held,
extradition could not be justified under section 1.
La Forest J., for the majority, replied that, in his view, it was
not appropriate to impose a constitutional requirement of
prosecution in Canada; there could be a variety of evidentiary or
procedural reasons why the other country was the preferable forum

34 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
35 Ibid. at 1480.
36

Ibid. at 1481.
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of trial. Therefore, La Forest J. said, the right "is infringed as little
37
as possible, or at the very least as little as reasonably possible."
He more or less acknowledged, however, that this was a "flexible"
application of the Oakes test - an approach, he pointed out, that
was sanctioned by Edwards Books.38 As in Edwards Books, the
broad interpretation of the right led to a relaxation in the standard
of section 1 justification.
VII. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
If we turn from the rights that have been interpreted broadly
- criminal justice rights, freedom of religion, freedom of expression,
and mobility - to the rights that have been interpreted narrowly, we
do find some recognition by individual judges of the close
relationship between the scope of the right and the standard of
justification under section 1.
In the Labour Trilogy,39 the Court had to interpret freedom
of association which is guaranteed by section 2(d) of the Charter.
The three cases involved three statutes (two provincial and one
federal) each of which denied the right to strike to a group of
workers. On a narrow interpretation of freedom of association,
there was no breach of the Charter. The workers' power to
associate together in a union, or any other form of association, was
not touched by any of the three statutes. What was affected was
the ability of the association, once formed, to carry out its objective
of improving the wages and working conditions of its members. On
a broad interpretation of freedom of association, the right would
extend beyond the right of individuals to form an association and
would protect at least some of the activities of the association itself,
including, in the case of a union, the right to strike. The argument
in favour of this broad interpretation was that the right to form a
37

lbid. at 1490.

38 Ibid. at 1489.
39 Reference Re Public Service Employees Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313
[hereinafter Alberta Reference]; PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 [hereinafter Six and
Five]; RWDSU v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 [hereinafter Dahyworkers].
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union was of little value if the legislative bodies were free to deprive
the union of the power to carry out its principal purpose.
The Court split on this difficult choice, with the majority
electing the narrower interpretation of freedom of association. The
narrower definition left the right to strike without constitutional
protection. The three statutes were therefore upheld. McIntyre J.,
who formed part of the majority, pointed out that a wide definition,
constitutionalizing the right to strike, would lead to the frequent
invocation of section 1, requiring the Court to make repeated policy
choices about the adequacy and justification of numerous legislated
alternatives to the right to strike.4 ° The implication was that many
of these alternatives would have to be upheld under section 1. The
force of this point was illustrated by the position of Dickson C.J.,
one of the two dissenters, who would have given constitutional
protection to the right to strike, but who was willing to use section
1 to sustain the back-to-work law in the Daiyworkers case 41 on the
basis of rather slight evidence. 42 The other dissenter, Wilson J., on
the other hand, voted for both a wide 43interpretation and a stringent
requirement of section 1 justification.
VIII. EQUALITY
A. Andrews Case
InAndrews v. Law Society of B.C.,44 the Court gave a narrow
interpretation to the equality rights that are guaranteed by section
15 of the Charter. The principal judgment on the meaning of
section 15 was that of McIntyre J., with whom all of the other
40

Alberta Reference, ibid at 419.

41 Supra, note 39.
42 In Alberta Reference, supra, note 39, Dickson CJ. did not find the section 1
justification sufficient, and in the Six and Five case, supra, note 39, he found the section 1

justification to be only partially sufficient.
43 Wilson J. found the section 1 justification insufficient in all three cases.
44 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter Andrews].
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judges agreed on this issue. The effect of the judgment was to
restrict section 15 so that it applied only to the enumerated and
analogous grounds, and so that it protected only disadvantaged
groups.
Despite this restriction of the right, McIntyre J. held that the
Oakes test was still too stringent a standard of section 1 justification,
and that a more relaxed standard should be applied.45 On the basis
of a lower standard, he held that the citizenship requirement in the
British Columbia statute regulating admission to the bar was justified
under section 1. Only Lamer J. agreed with this conclusion, which
meant that McIntyre J. ended up in dissent. La Forest J. agreed
that a standard of justification lower than Oakes was appropriate in
equality cases, 46 but he still held that the citizenship requirement
could not be justified under section 1. However, La Forest J.'s
reasoning meant that three of the six judges agreed that the Oakes
standard should be relaxed in equality cases.
The opinion of the other three judges in Andrews was
written by Wilson J., with whom Dickson C.J. and L'Heureux-Dub6
J. agreed. Wilson J. invoked the relationship between the scope of
the right and the standard of justification to support her adherence
to the Oakes test. She said that the Oakes test "remains an
appropriate standard when it is recognized that not every distinction
between individuals and groups will violate s. 15. 4 7 She added:
"Given that s. 15 is designed to protect those groups who suffer
social, political and legal disadvantage in our society, the burden
resting on government to justify the type of discrimination against
such groups is appropriately an onerous one."48 Here was a very
clear recognition of the relationship between the scope of the right
and the standard of justification.
As Wilson J. recognized in Andrews, the equality guarantee
of section 15 is perhaps the easiest example of the relationship
between the scope of the right and the standard of justification

45 Ibid. at 184.
46

Ibid. at 197-98.

47 Ibid. at 154.
48 Ibid
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under section 1. If section 15 were interpreted as condemning every
legislative classification, from the graduated rates of income tax
(which discriminate on the basis of income) to the regime of
securities regulation (which discriminates on the basis of the kind of
property bought or sold), the Oakes test would be an impossible
burden to impose upon government. Virtually every law could be
challenged under section 15, and each challenge would have to be
resolved under section 1. Given the range of policy choices
inherent in any regime of social or economic regulation, it would
usually be impossible to establish that the distinctions actually made
were minimum impairments of equality. But once section 15 was
narrowed to encompass only discrimination against the named and
analogous groups, and even then only against disadvantaged groups,
the great majority of potential equality challenges would fail at the
section 15 stage of judicial review. For those few challenges that
could meet the Andrews requirements, so that they had to be
resolved under section 1, surely Wilson J. was right to insist that a
strict standard of section 1 justification be applied.
The equality guarantee also illustrates the difference between
a generous interpretation and a purposive interpretation. The most
generous interpretation of a Charterright is the widest interpretation
the language will bear. But it will rarely be the case that a
purposive interpretation will support the widest interpretation that
the language will bear. A purposive interpretation relies upon the
purpose of the right to narrow the scope of the right. In the case
of section 15, the contrast between a generous interpretation and
a purposive interpretation could not be more marked. As noticed
earlier, a generous interpretation of section 15 exposes nearly all
laws to challenge under section 15 and requires that their validity be
determined under section 1. In fact, until the Andrews case was
decided in the Supreme Court of Canada, the number of section 15
challenges was enormous. A study prepared in 1988,49 only three
years after the coming into force of section 15 (which occurred on

49

G. Brodsky & S. Day, CanadianCharterEquality Rights for Women: One Step Forward
or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989) at
277.
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17 April 19850), found 591 cases (most, but not all, of which were
reported) in which a law had been challenged under section 15. Of
course, the courts found ways (sometimes within section 15 itself and
sometimes within section 1) to reject the majority of these
challenges, but the absence of any clear restrictions on the scope of
section 15 encouraged lawyers to keep trying to use it whenever
some statutory distinction worked to the disadvantage of a client.
The American courts have limited the open-ended character
of the equality guarantee in the fourteenth amendment by the
doctrine of levels of scrutiny. By deciding that most classifications
attract only minimal scrutiny, the courts have ensured that equal
protection challenges that were not based on race, sex, or the
abridgement of fundamental rights would nearly always fail.51
Indeed, it was something like a doctrine of minimal scrutiny that
made the equality clause in the Canadian Bill of Rights so
ineffective. With the single exception of the Drybones case,5 2 the
Supreme Court of Canada readily accepted whatever rationale was
supplied by government for any chall6nged distinction, and the
challenge was rejected.
Neither the Canadian Bill of Rights jurisprudence nor the
American jurisprudence offered a particularly attractive way for
Canadian courts to control the floodgates opened by section 15 of
the Charter. But section 15 itself offered some clues to its purpose
that were missing from its counterparts in the Canadian Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment. The named grounds of "race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability" pointed to personal characteristics of individuals
that have often been the targets of prejudice and stereotyping. The
reference in subsection (2) (the affirmative action clause) to
"disadvantaged individuals or groups" suggested that the role of
section 15 was to correct discrimination against disadvantaged

50

The Charter of Rights came into force on 17 April 1982, but section 32(2) postponed

the coming into force of section 15 for three years. The purpose was to allow time for
compliance measures.
51 See L.H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.:

Press, 1988) c. 16.
52 R. v. Drybones (1969), [1970] S.C.R. 282 [hereinafter Drybones].
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individuals or groups. These references suggested that the purpose
of section 15 was not to eliminate all unfairness from our laws, let
alone all classifications that could not be rationally defended, but
rather to eliminate discrimination based on the personal
characteristics of persons or groups who are disadvantaged in our
society. In Andrews, these references were invoked to restrict the
scope of section 15 to the named or analogous grounds, and to add
a requirement of systemic disadvantage or powerlessness as well.
It is important to acknowledge frankly that the interpretation
of section 15 in Andrews is not a generous one. On the contrary,
it is the narrowest interpretation that the language will reasonably
bear. It will cause a dramatic reduction in section 15 challenges.
That dramatic reduction can easily be inferred from the outcomes of
the two section 15 cases that, at the time of writing, have been
decided by the Court since Andrews.
B. Workers' Compensation Reference
In Reference Re Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 (Nfld.), 53
a section 15 challenge was mounted against the provision in The
Workers' CompensationAct, 1983 of Newfoundland that denies to an
injured worker the right to sue his or her employer in tort. (A
similar provision exists in all ten provinces.) It was argued that the
denial of the tort action was a violation of section 15, because other
accident victims, for example, those injured on the roads, could bring
a tort action for damages against the person whose fault caused the
accident. The Court disposed of the case in a single paragraph.
Since the singling out of work-related accident victims did not
depend upon any of the grounds of discrimination named in section
15, and was not analogous to the named grounds, there could be no
breach of section 15. This defeated the challenge and avoided the
need for the Court to proceed to section 1, which would have
entailed an evaluation of the policy reasons for the standard
Canadian workers' compensation system.

53 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922.

836

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 28 NO. 4

C. Turpin Case
In R. v. Turpin,5 4 a section 15 challenge was mounted to a
provision of the Criminal Code that stipulated that certain of the
most serious offences, including murder, were to be tried by judge
and jury, with no right to elect a trial by judge alone. The section
15 argument was based on another provision of the Criminal Code,
applicable only in Alberta, which gave to an accused person the
right to elect a trial by judge alone for all indictable offenses,
including murder. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this
argument, and it did so on the basis of the second element of
discrimination stipulated by Andrews, namely, the presence of
disadvantage. Wilson J., for an unanimous Court, said that it was
not sufficient for the equality claimant to show that he or she was
disadvantaged by the impugned law. That, obviously, was necessary,
but it was not sufficient. The claimant had to go further and show
that the distinction employed by the statute was one that defined a
group that was disadvantaged in other respects. Province of
residence (or trial) did not, at least in the context of this case,
identify a disadvantaged group. The claim would not, Wilson J. said,
"advance the purposes of s. 15 in remedying or preventing
discrimination against groups suffering social, political and legal
disadvantage in our society."55 Since the claim was outside the
purpose of section 15, it was also outside the scope of section 15,
and the claim accordingly was rejected.
D. Comment
Has the Court done the right thing in so severely narrowing
the scope of section 15? I think so. As an analytical matter, the
actual language of section 15, with its references to named grounds
of discrimination and to disadvantage, does provide a plausible
textual basis for the Court's ruling. As a matter of policy, there is
much to be said for confining the benefit of section 15 to those
54 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
55

Ibid. at 1333.
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persons or groups who suffer from prejudice, stereotyping, or
systemic disadvantage. They are the groups who, by definition,
cannot easily use the political process to redress their grievances.
For other groups, who do not lack access to the political process,
claims of unfair treatment can arguably be left to the political
process for correction.
What is lost in the Court's approach is the case where a
claimant can show an arbitrary and harmful distinction but is unable
to bring the case within a named or analogous ground or is unable
to show disadvantage of a more general kind. That case could be
one of real injustice, even though it is an injustice of an isolated or
idiosyncratic kind. Moreover, attempts to remedy the injustice in
the political arena may have failed. But the price of catching that
case is to leave the scope of review under section 15 so wide that
some doctrine akin to minimal scrutiny would have to be developed
to deal with the flood of unmeritorious cases. If the scope of
review under section 15 is kept narrow, then the standard of review
can be quite strict. In particular, the rules of justification under
section 1 can be the same strict rules that Oakes laid down for other
Charter limits.5 6 Bearing in mind that the Constitution should not
be seen as the solution to every unfairness, and that the courts
ought not to replace elected officials as the principal forum of
political change, the Supreme Court of Canada's limitation of section
15 is a wise act of judicial restraint.
IX. CONCLUSION
! What does all this teach us for the future? I believe the
purposive approach to the definition of Charter rights will gradually
supplant the generous approach. The rights will become narrower;
they will protect less behaviour; but they will afford real, not
illusory, protection to that behaviour. Once a right is narrowed t6
its purpose, it is appropriate to insist upon the stringent Oakes
standard of justification. The ascendancy of the purposive approach

56 But note the difference of opinion in the Andrews Court on this issue:
accompanying notes 40-43, supra at 831ff.
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will therefore be accompanied by the revival of the Oakes standard
of justification.
These developments should not provide an inferior
protection for the civil liberties guaranteed by the Charter. On the
contrary, once Charter guarantees are expanded beyond their
purpose, the judicial impulse to uphold legislation in the face of
trivial Charter claims inevitably leads to a weakening of the section
1 standard of justification. Trivial Charterclaims will fail even under
a generous interpretation of Charter rights. But the weakening of
the section 1 standard of justification carries the risk that worthy
Charter claims may also fail. It is far better, I would argue, to
eliminate the trivial claims in the first stage of Charter interpretation
by excluding them from the definition of the right. The worthy
claims that are included in the definition of the right will then be
more likely to repel a section 1 justification, because the burden of
justification resting on the government can be much heavier.
The reason for, and the result of, these developments will be
a reduction in the volume of Charter litigation, a diminution of the
policy-making role of the courts, and an increase in the predictability
of Charter litigation. All of these results are heartily to be desired
- especially if they can be had, as I argue they can be, without cost
to the protection of the civil libertarian values of the Charter.

